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1INTRODUCTION
It is a common assumption in reinforcement theories
that variation in incentive magnitude produces correspond-
ing changes in performance* However, this assumption is
not supported by the results of research in several experi-
mental situations in which incentive has been varied between-
Ss with each S experiencing a single incentive level. In a
review of incentive studies with animal Ss
,
Pubols (i960)
concluded that variation in incentive magnitude has no sig-
nificant effect on time-independent measures of learning
when an absolute method (i.e., between-Ss design) is used.
Pubols* conclusion has more recently received support from
studies employing human Ss in which incentive magnitude
was varied using the absolute method. For example, Harley
(1965b) observed no significant difference in mean percent
correct responses between two groups rewarded with Of and
25/ for each correct response in a list of paired associ-
ates (PAs). Myers, Fort, Katz, and Suydam (1963) found
only insignificant differences in ?{k^) (the probability
of choosing the more frequent event) between two groups
which risked 10^ and 1^ on each trial in a probability
learning task. In light of these facts, Pubols* conclusion
about the lack of an incentive effect under the absolute
2method may be extended to include human Ss.
While the absolute method has led to negative findings,
a differential method in which each S experiences more than
one incentive level has consistently produced significant
incentive effects. In his review, Pubols concluded that
animal learning is directly related to incentive magnitude
when a differential, or within-Ss, design is used. Once
more, later research has revealed parallel results with
human Ss. Harley (1965a) found significantly better PA
anticipation for high incentive pairs using the differen-
tial method whereas he failed to observe this incentive
effect with the absolute method of incentive presentation
(1965b). Similarily, Lipkin, Schnorr, Suydam, and Myers
(1965) found P(A^) directly related to the amount of risk
in a noncontingent two-choice study. In a direct compari-
son of a between-Ss and a within-Ss design, Schnorr, Lipkin,
and Myers (In press) found a marked incentive effect under
the within-Ss manipulation while both risk levels of the
between-Ss design led to asymptotic P(A 1 ) equal to that
obtained under the higher within-Ss risk level. Apparently,
it may be inferred as a general principle of behavior that
the effects of incentive on performance depend upon the
type of experimental design employed. A necessary condition
for observing an effect among positive levels of incentive
would seem to be that each 5 has experience with more than
3one incentive level.
The Schnorr et al,. study allowed observation of the
manner in which exposure to more than one incentive level
operates to elicit an incentive effect. The significance
of the incentive effect in their within-Ss design was at-
tributed to a negative contrast effect in the form of a
"depression" of P(A^) on low risk trials. There was no
concurrent enhancement of performance on the high risk
trials. Schnorr, e£ al. also collected subjective esti-
mates of tt, the proportion of occurrences of the more fre-
quent event. These measures (tt,,) also exhibited negative
contrast and were significantly correlated with P(A
1
) for
each subject. This may indicate that the incentive effect
is caused by a distortion in Ss * perception of rr under the
differential method; however, other explanations cannot
yet be ruled out.
The finding of a negative contrast effect between
levels of Incentive is not novel in animal or human work.
With two levels of reward "randomly alternated," Bower ( 1961 )
found that rats decreased their running speed in the small
reward runway after an initial block of trials in which
running speed was equal for the two alleys. As controls,
he also ran constant reward groups with the large and small
rewards. In the differential group there was a significant
depression in the small reward runway relative to the constant
4small reward group without concurrent elation on high re-
ward trials. Spence (1956) also found that a shift to a
smaller reward produced a depression in the reciprocal of
running time of rats while a shift to a larger reward did
not lead to elation relative to a pre-shift asymptote.
Similarly, with human Ss in a three-choice situation,
Swensson (1965) observed a significant depression in P(A^)
for a group shifted from payoff to no payoff, but there
was no corresponding upward shift for a group with the
opposite change in reward.
The present experiment was designed to investigate
negative contrast effects between two incentives as a func-
tion of event frequencies under each incentive level. The
methodology was very similar to that used in the within-Ss
portion of the Schnorr et gJL. study. In this procedure,
5s must predict which of two designs is on the back of each
card in a deck while the amount to be risked on any predic-
tion appears on the exposed side of that card. As in the
Schnorr et al. study, random sequences of 50 high risk and
50 low risk trials per trial block were used. However, in
the present design eight groups were formed on the basis of
tt on high and low risk trials (tt h * .60, .70; ttl
-
.50, .60,
. 70
,
. 80 ). Whereas Schnorr et al. had held both tt h and tt l
equal to *.60, the present study pits the strength of the
incentive effect against an increasingly high tt l , and
thereby
5affords information about the relative strengths of and
incentive.
Schnorr et al. found that P(A^) approximated
.50 on
low risk trials which had a tt of .60, and suggested that
this "chance level" performance may have resulted from Ss
"Ignoring" low risk trials to deal more effectively with
the high risk trials. The present study provided a test
of this hypothesis through a comparison of performance
levels on low risk trials across the eight groups. If the
hypothesis is correct, P(A^) in the present study should
approximate .50 on low risk trials for all four groups at
each of the two tth levels. However, to find no differences
in P(A
1
) over these four tt levels would be surprising
since tt has generally been the most potent variable in the
probability learning literature. On the other hand, the
Schnorr £t al. findings may have been due to a distortion
of tt^, which would lead to a prediction of low risk perfor-
mance in the present study increasing with, but consistently
undershooting,^.
Several other Interesting comparisons and theoretical
implications are suggested by the two-choice discrimination
studies of Popper and Atkinson (1958), Atkinson, Bogartz,
and Turner (1959), Uhl (1964), and others. The procedure
of the present study is identical to that used in two-choice
discrimination studies with the exception that the pre-trial
6cue in those studies has no value aside from its informa-
tion role. In view of the similar experimental paradigms
of discrimination studies and the present within-Ss incen-
tive manipulation, a brief description of some relevant
mathematical models of discrimination learning seems appro-
priate. There are several models available (e.g., Burke
and Estes, 1957? Estes, 1959; Atkinson, 1958) which hove
been able to predict the general data trends in certain
relatively simple discrimination experiments.
Popper and Atkinson (1958) and Atkinson et al. (1959)
have shown that ^(A^) given a highly reliable cue (i.e.,
one with a high or low tt value) is an increasing function
of the reliability of a second cue. Within the range of tt
values of the present study, these two discrimination
studies have also shown that PfA^ given the cue of lower
reliability was displaced away from tt -matching toward the
tt value associated with the more reliable cue. This con-
vergence of response probabilities or generalization be-
tween cues is relevant in judging the appropriateness of
mathematical models.
Provided such generalization is not observed in the
present experiment, the pattern model (Estes, 1959) or an
extension designed to handle the overshooting typically
found with Incentives (Myers and Atkinson, 1964) may be
applicable to the data. In the pattern model, responses
7become conditioned to total patterns of stimulation rather
than to stimulus components. There is no parameter in the
model to relate degree of stimulus similarity to discrimina-
tion performance. Thus, successful discrimination is pre-
dicted whenever the two relevant stimulus patterns are not
identical. Since the two pre-trial cues in the present
study (indicating the incentive levels) were noticeably dif-
ferent, the pattern model would predict asymptotic probabil-
ity matching.
On the other hand, a pattern model would not be com-
patible with the data if generalization between the two in-
centives occurs. For instance, the pattern model must pre-
dict equal asymptotes for 10-chip trials with a it of .60
regardless of differences in tt across groups. If observed
Li
10-chlp performance is a function of the value of tt^ as well
as tt , a model which deals with a stimulus overlap would be
H
more appropriate (Burke and Estes, 1957} Bush and Mos teller,
1951 ). In the Burke-Estes component model, increased over-
lap between two hypothetical stimulus sets leads to predic-
tions of poorer discrimination performance. Consequently,
if 10-chip performance is a function of rr L or
1-chip per-
formance a function of tt^, then the component model could
account for such generalization in terms of stimulus over-
lap or similarity.
Aside from the component model, other models have been
8developed by Atkinson (1958) and Lee ( 1966 ) which can pre-
dict generalization. Atkinson»s (1958) Markov model can
fit the general data trends of the Popper and Atkinson
(1958) and Atkinson et al. (1959) studies. According to
this model, the 3 may either make an observing response or
not at the start of each trial; and if he does not observe,
he samples stimulus elements common to the two sets of
discriminative stimuli. Whereas this sampling of common
elements enables the Atkinson model to predict generaliza-
tion between cues, Lee ( 1966 ^ accounts for the same results
with a conditioning-parameter model. This model also allows
a prediction of generalization since reinforcement not only
increases the probability of a response under identical
stimulating conditions, but also under all other conditions.
While both this model and the component model can predict
generalization, P(A^) must be a linear function ofrr., and
tt . However, the Atkinson (1958) model has the added advan-
L
tage of being able to predict a nonlinear relationship.
Although one or more of these models may be able to predict
some of the general data trends in the present study, some
inadequacy was expected because of the overshooting of tt
usually observed in incentive studies.
Another important consideration for mathematical models
in the present study was the observed probability that a
given response occurred on trial q given the response-event
9combination on trial n-1
. Analysis of such first-order
conditional statistics from the Schnorr ot a^. study re-
vealed gross deviations from theoretical predictions. It
was found that the probability of repeating an A response
was greater following an incorrect than a correct prediction
of A. on the preceding trial, i.o., P(A. A, . E ) >i»n l,n-l 2,n-l
P
^ A
1 ,n |
A
l ,n-l
E
l,n-1^* Precisely the opposite order of
these conditionals Is predicted by all existing models which
call for increments in response probability following rein-
forcement and decrements following nonreinforcement. Halpern
(1965) and Moore and Halpern ( 1966 ) have obtained similar
inversions in the conditional statistics from two-choice
auditory discrimination experiments. This type of deviation
from theory is interesting with regard to the models, and
it is, perhaps, much more important in presenting a basic
challenge to reinforcement theory in general. Therefore,
in the present study, the observed conditional statistics
and possible generalization between incentives were assessed
in relation to existing models.
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METHOD
Subjects . The ^>s were 80 male and 80 female under-
graduate volunteers from the introductory psychology course
at the University of Massachusetts.
Design and Procedure
. The major independent variables
were incentive level (l or 10 chips) and the proportion of
the more frequent event within each incentive level (tt^ and
ttl ) . There were 8 experimental groups, of 20 5s each,
formed by crossing the 2 tt
T j levels and 4 tt l levels. With-
in each group, the 20 Ss were evenly divided among 4 combi-
nations of 2 experimenters and the 2 sexes to form 32 cells
of 5 Ss each.
After being randomly assigned to one of the 32 cells,
each S was required to predict which of two geometric de-
signs (point or line) was on the back of each card cf a 100
card deck. Each of the two experimenters used a different
geometric design as the more frequent event (E^) to allow
for statistical control of design preferences and experi-
menter differences as a single confounded source of variance.
On the face of 50 cards there was a ”10" and on the face of
the other half of the cards there was a "1" designating the
number of chips S must risk on the succeeding prediction.
Each S was given an initial stake of 200 chips. The rela-
tive event frequencies (E^iEg) were specific to the level
11
of risk so that the overall tt for each £ was the average of
his specific values of tt and rr .
H L
Each experimental session consisted of 400 trials
obtained by having S go through the deck four times. The
sequence of incentive levels and events was randomized by
thoroughly shuffling the deck in full view of S before each
block of trials. This procedure and the instructions were
intended to discourage any search for specific patterns in
the cards. The Ss were run one at a time and were self-
paced .
Three types of dependent measures were obtained for
the data analysis. The marginal and conditional response
probabilities were calculated from the sequence of each S*s
responses. Following the fourth block of trials each S
was given a questionnaire to record his subjective estimates
of (a) the proportion of 10-chip trials, (b) tt^, and (c) n^.
12
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Marginal response probabilities
. Table 1 shows the
F-ratios from the analysis of variance of P(A
1
) scores for
the eight experimental groups. The magnitude of P(A^) over
all eight groups varied directly and significantly as a
function of both tt h , F( 1,128) = 24.43, £<;001, and of
F(3,128) = 17.45, £<.001. The overall incentive effect was
also significant, F(l,128) = 78.57, £<.001, with P(A
X
)
greater on 10-chip trials than on 1-chip trials. A more
analytic description of the combined effects of tth , tt j ,
and incentive is presented in Fig. 1 which shows the course
of training for each group of 20 Ss. For convenience, each
group is designated according to the tth :ttl combination used.
The incentive effect shown for the .60:. 50 group was
expected since both rr and incentive favored the observed
separation of performance in this group. However, the data
for the .60:. 60 group is interesting because it replicated
the Schnorr et al. study. As the figure shows, P(A^) was
about 19% higher on the 10-chip trials after 400 trials in
which tth and ttl both equalled .60. The magnitude
of this
incentive effect and the performance levels under the two
incentive conditions are quite similar to those obtained by
Schnorr et al. and by Lipkin et al. (1965).
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Table 1
F-Ratios from Analysis of Variance
of P(A^) Scores
Source of Variance df F-Ratio
Between-Ss:
High Risk tt (H) 1 24.43 £<.001
Low Risk tt (L) 3 17.45 £<.001
Experimenter (E) 1 .76
Sex (X) 1 .06
L H 3 .47
E H 1 .92
X H 1 1.16
L E 3 • 36
L X 3 .78
E X 1 .02
L E H 3 .18
L X H 3 .84
E X H 1 1.13
LEX 3 .07
L E X H 3 .59
Ss/L E X H 12b (275.90)
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Table 1 (cont’d.)
Source of Variance af F-Ratio
Within-Ss s
Incentive (I) 1 78.57 £<.001
I H 1 14.14 £<.001
L I 3 9.17 £<.001
E I 1 8.54 £<.005
X I 1 2.63 £<.20
LIH 3 3.04 £<• 10
E I H 1 .00
X I H 1 1.26
LEI 3 .75
L X I 3 .57
E X I 1 .01
L E I H 3 1.53
L X I H 3 1.61 £<.20
E X I H 1 .30
L E X I 3 3.35 £<.025
L E X I H 3 .80
128 (154.28)I Ss/L E X H
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Table 1 (cont’d.)
Source of Variance
_df F-Ratio
Trial Blocks (T) 3 89.10 £<.001
T H 3 5.75 £<.001
T L 9 , 2.27 £<.025
T E 3 .27
T X 3 .44
T L H 9 .37
TEH 3 .05
T X H 3 .50
T L E 9 • 33
TLX 9 • 85
TEX 3 .45
TLEH 9 .40
TLXH 9 • 03 00
T E X H 3 .45
T L E X 9 .72
T L E X H 9 CO•
T S/L E X H 384 (35.77)
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Table 1 (cont»d.)
Source of Variance df F-Ratio
T I 3 2.01 £<.20
T I H 3 1.34
T L I 9 3.08 £<.005
T E I 3 • 36
T X I 3 .15
TLI H 9 1.38 £<.20
T E I H 3 .15
T X I H 3 1.45
T L E I 9 .64
T L X I 9 2.13 £<.05
T E X I 3 .15
T L E I H 9 .58
T L X I H 9 1.23
T E X I H 3 .37
T L E X I 9 .69
TLEXIH 9 1.13
T I S/L E X H 384 (37.28)
17
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The graph for the .60:. 70 group demonstrates the
strength of the wlthln-^s Incentive effect. In this group,
1-chip trials had a ttl equal to .70, and 10-chip trials had
a rr^ equal to .60. Thus, in spite of the fact that event
frequencies were fixed in such a way as to oppose an incen-
tive effect, P(A
1
) was higher on the 10-chip trials through-
out the course of training. The data from a condition even
more unfavorable to observing an incentive effect are shown
in the graph for the .60:. 80 group. Even though tt^ exceeded
tt^ by 20$, the results show that P(A
1
) on 10-chip trials
was slightly greater than P(A^) on 1-chip trials for 200
trials, after which the incentive effect was reversed.
The lower half of Fig. 1 displays the results for the
groups in which tth was .70 and was either .50, .60, .70,
or .80. The very large effect of incentive in the .70:. 50
group was to be expected since it was favored by both tt and
incentive, but the fact that P(A^) on 1-chip trials was less
than 50$ is of interest since it illustrates the depressed
performance levels on low risk trials that has previously
been observed in within-Ss incentive work (Schnorr et aj..,
Lipkin et al.
,
1965). In the .70:. 60 group, the incentive
effect persisted as would be expected since tth was still 10
$
greater than ttl . However,
the incentive difference dis-
played by the .70:. 70 group is worth note in view of the
Myers et al. (1963) study which showed no difference between
19
10^ and P(A^) levels when incentive was varied between-
bs with tt equal to .70. Again, the strength of the wl thin-
gs incentive effect is revealed in the data of the .70:. 80
group. Here exceeded tt
h by 10^ but an early incentive
difference persisted through 300 trials. It is interesting
to note the similarities between the data for the .70:. 80
and .60:. 80 conditions. Apparently, the incentive effect
makes itself felt very early in training and then may be
reversed with further training if tt l is greater than tt^.
Figure 2 shows the data points for the fourth block of
trials from each of the preceding figures. Aside from the
groups with of .50> P(A
;j
) levels on 10-chip trials were
well within the range of what would be expected on the basis
of between-3s incentive work (Myers et al
. , 1963; Schnorr
et al,. ) . On the other hand, ?{A^) on the 1-chip trials was
depressed downward relative to the between-Ss data, a finding
which replicates the negative contrast effect observed by
Schnorr et al. However, the increments in P(A^) on 1-chip
trials following increases in tt l dispels the suggestion by
Schnorr et al. that the within-Ss incentive effect may be
due to Ss "ignoring” low risk trials.
Figure 2 also reveals evidence of generalization in
that P(A
X )
for 10-chip trials was affected by the value of
tt t , and P(A,
)
for 1-chip trials was affected by the value
of tt^. For instance, the P(A 1 ) curve for
10-chip trials
20
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with tth equal to .70 tended to increase as a function of
ttl , and the curve for 10-chip trials with tth equal to .60
appeared to be a more complex funotion of rr L . Similarly,
PU^ for 1-chip trials appears to have been affected by
the value of tt^. The two P(A^) functions for 1-chip trials
in Fig. 2 are based on groups with Identical levels of risk
anC* h°WQVer
>
P(A^) on 1-chip trials was higher for the
groups with tt^ equal to .70. Whereas Fig. 2 shows only the
fourth block of trials, Figs. 3 and 4 illustrate this gen-
eralization over all trials. In Fig. 3, the positive slope
of the 10-chip function follows the change of rr H , but the
positive slope of the 1-chip function is further evidence
of generalization since tt^ is constant. This Incentive x
tt h interaction was statistically significant, F( 1,128) *
14.14, £<.001, and the positive slope of the 1-chip function
approaches significance, F( 1,256) = 2.91, £<.10. Additional
confirmation of generalization is provided by the data in
Fig. 4. In this figure, the positive slope of the 1-chip
function is not surprising; however, the significant nonzero
slope of the 10-chip function reflects the interdependence
of P(A^) for the two incentive levels, F(3»256) * 7.68,
£<.001. Thus, it seems safe to conclude that P(Aj) for
10-chip trials was a function of rr^, and for 1-chip
trials also tended to be directly related to rr^.
Figure 4 is of additional interest in relation to the
22
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findings of Popper and Atkinson (1958) and Atkinson et al.
(1959). The present study shows P(A ) for 10-chip trials
to be an increasing function of the value of Just as
the two earlier discrimination studies found responses to
one cue directly related to the reliability of a second
cue.
In review, marginal response probabilities showed
strong within-Ss incentive effects whenever tt^ was greater
than or equal to tt^. Furthermore, the incentive effect
occurred early in training and tended to persist even when
ttl exceeded tt^. This within-Ss incentive effect was in
the form of depressed P(A^) under the lower incentive com-
pared with that observed in between-Ss work. Generalization
was also found since P(A^) for 10-chip trials was a func-
tion of ttl , and PfA^ for 1-chip trials tended to be a
function of tt .
ii
From these findings with marginal response probabili-
ties, it is clear that the pattern model is not compatible
with the present data. The pattern model does not predict
the observed interdependence of P(A^) levels for 10-chip
and 1-chip trials. Since this model and the component
model both predict an upper bound of tt^ for 10-chip per-
formance and a lower bound of tt^ for 1-chip performance,
they fail to account for the incentive effect which typi-
cally leads to overshooting of rr^ and sometimes to
25
depressions of 1-chip performance below ttt . While the
Myers and Atkinson (1964) weak-strong model, a modifica-
tion of the pattern model, can predict the overshooting of
tt^, it cannot predict undershooting of tt^ nor can it handle
the observed changes in performance under each incentive
level as a function of the tt value of the second incentive.
The Lee ( 1966 ) and Atkinson (1958) models which can account
for generalization are not applicable to incentive data for
the same reasons the pattern and component models are not.
Subjective reports . Figure 5 shows the subjective
estimates of tt and rr_ for all eight groups. These esti-
n L
mates were obtained immediately following the fourth trial
block. Analysis of variance shows subjective estimates to
be directly related to ttjj £( 1 , 152 ) * 9 * 29 » £<. 005 , tt
,
F(3,152) = 6 . 75 , £<. 001 , and incentive, F( 1
,
151 ) = 33.81,
p<.001. In general, Ss tended to perform at levels above
their estimates of tt as is revealed in a comparison of
Figures 2 and 5 . A comparison of the 1-chip curves for tts
and data shows that while P(A
1
) on 1-chip trials was
shifted upward by a higher tt^, 1-chip data were about
the same for the two levels of tt . In other words, 5s gave
similar estimates of ttl after having performed
quite dif-
ferently on 1-chip trials as a function of tt^. This finding
implies that an 3*s actual choice performance is not solely
dependent on his perception of relative event frequencies.
26
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The finding that the 1-chip rr function had a positive
ij
slope, supports the conclusion, mentioned above, that the
within-Ss incentive effect is not merely the result of Ss
"ignoring” low risk trials. The data are more compatible
with the notion that the within-Ss procedure caused down-
ward distortions in tt on low risk trials. While this
lowered was related to lower P(A^), the relationship
was not simply one-to-one as was pointed out above. As
Pig. 5 shows, there was an interaction in Ss* perception
of TTpj and tt^ such that tt^ undershoot tt^ and overshoot tt^.
In order to reach a more complete description of the rela-
tion between tt and P(A ) , it would have been useful toO X
obtain subjective estimates at several points in training.
Subjects were also asked to estimate the proportion
of trials worth 10 chips. As Table 2 shows, these estimates
were quite accurate with a very slight underestimation for
the groups with n u of .60 and an even slighter overestima-n
tion for the groups with equal to .70.
Conditional statistics . The first-order conditional
statistics from the fourth trial block are shown in Table 3.
Each of the 16 statistics for the 8 groups of Ss gives the
probability of an A
1
response on trial n, given the incen-
tive level on trial n and the incentive-response-event com-
bination on trial n-1 . Table 3 shows these statistics sub-
divided in terms of the four possible incentive combinations
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Table 2
Average Subjective Estimates for
Per Cent 10-Chip Trials,
tth andnT .
TT = .60 TT **
. 70
H H
% 10-chip
nH nL
% 10-chip
n
H nLTrials Trials
.5 48.0 64.5 47.0 51-5 76.5 49.5
.6 51.0 65.5 55.0 50.0 74.5 57.0
L
.7 48.5 65.0 61.0 53.0 73.0 60.0
.8 45.0 68.0 67.5 47.5 70.5 70.5
48.1 50.5
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from trial rwl to trial n.
The rank order of the conditionals is of prime interest
in order to assess the appropriateness of several mathemati-
cal models. According to these models, the first statistic
in each set of four must be the largest and the fourth must
be the smallest while the ranks of the second and third de-
pend on the values of the parameters of the models (l.e.,
p (A, J A r, iE - )>P(A. I a Eo J and p (A„ |A0i,n! l,n-l 1 ,n-l l,n! i, n-l 2,n-l l,n| 2,n-l
L J>P(A, \A n El.n-1 l,n| 2 ,n-l 2,n-l )). A brief presentation of the
predicted conditional statistics from the component model
(Burke and Estes, 1957) » the pattern model (Estes, 1959)
»
the conditioning-parameter model (Lee, 1966), and the ob-
serving response model (Atkinson, 1958) Is given below to
demonstrate the rank order of these expressions.
In the component model, there is a hypothetical set of
stimulus elements for each incentive level and an intersec-
tion of the sets comprising common elements and background
cues. On each trial S samples stimulus elements from both
the unique set associated with the relevant incentive and
from the common set. The probability of either the A^ or
A^ response is determined by the proportion of sampled stimu-
lus elements conditioned to it. The model calls for an
increment in P(A^) following an E^ and a decrement lollowing
an E
2
according to two specific linear operators. For sim-
plicity, the expressions given below are for the case in
Asymptotic
First-Order
Conditional
Statistics
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which the incentive level is the same on trials n and n-1
.
P(A
1 yil
A
1 , E„ Jl,nl 1 ,n-l l ,n-l
P(A
1 >n| A 1 ,n-lE2,n-ll
P
^ Al,n| A2,n-lE l,n-l )
P(Al,n|A2,n-lE2,n-l )
* (l-9)a + 9
= ( 1-9 )
a
* ( 1-9 ) b + 9
= ( l-9)b
where a =
, ,
a2,n-l
,
b =
a
i,n-l~
a
2.n-l
Ot i .
1— OL-
.
1 »n-l 1 ,n-l
a = i^*1 raw moment of the distribution of
response probabilities over Ss.
Clearly, the first statistic must be larger than the second,
and the third must be larger than the fourth regardless of
the parameter values.
In a pattern model with each of N stimulus patterns con-
ditioned to A. or A . it is assumed that one pattern is sampled
1 2
on a trial. The conditioning state of the sampled pattern
determines the response; and if the response is correct, the
pattern's conditioning state remains unchanged. However,
if the response is incorrect, there is a probability c that
the pattern becomes conditioned to the event presented on
that trial. Again, the following theoretical expressions
are for two consecutive trials with the same incentive level.
F(A
l,n| A l,n-lE l,n-l ) " TT "
+
TT
P(A l,nl A l,n-In2.n-1 )
=
"
+
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P( A
| Al.nl
;
P(A
l,nl
A
2
E )
,n-l l,n-l
E )
»n-l 2 ,n-l
N-l
IT TT
Inspection shows that the first statistic must be the largest
and the fourth, the smallest while the ranks of the second
and third depend on the value of c.
Lee’s conditioning-parameter model is very similar to
the pattern model with the exception that there is an addi-
tional parameter to allow for generalization. However,
this generalization does not enter into the case of two
consecutive trials with identical incentives. For this
case, the theoretical expressions for the conditional statis-
tics are of the same form as those from the pattern model.
The derivation of theoretical expressions of conditional
statistics from the Atkinson observing response model is much
more complex. The complications result from the assumptions
that there are 16 possible conditioning states, an observing
response preceding the actual A or A choice response, and
the usual conditioning parameters. While it is beyond the
scope of this study to present the complete proof that the
rank order of the conditionals is identical to that of the
preceding models, a proof that P(A^ >n | A i ,n-lE l jn-l^^ A 1 »n|
A« „ E J is given in the Appendix.l,n-l 2, n-l
While the preceding models concur on the rank order of
the predicted conditional statistics, the observed first-order
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conditional statistics shown in Table 3 did not show this
rank ordering. For instance, when the incentive level was
10 chips on trials n and n^l, P(A. I A. .E_ J exceededi,n| l,n-l 2, n-1
P(A
l,n| A l,n-lE l,n-l ) in 4 Z™?*’ P(A 1 ,n| A2
exceeded P(A. I A E ) in 3 groups. When the incen-A » n | <d,n-l l,n-l
tive level was 10 chips on trial n-1 and 1 chip on trial n,
P(A, E ) was the smallest of the 4 conditionall,n| 1 ,n-l i,n-l
statistics in 6 groups and third in rank in the other two
groups. In other words, P(A^) Increased less following a
direct reinforcement than after any other response-event
combination. Further inspection of Table 3 reveals a variety
of inversions in the ranks of the conditionals when the in-
centive level was 1 chip on trial n-1 and 10 chips on trial
n. Finally, the conditionals based on two consecutive 1-chip
trials show that P(A
and P(A, A,
l»n l,n-l 2, n-1
)>P( A« „ |
A
)>P(A. A E )
1 ,n l ,n-l l ,n-i
E.
_ . ) each in 6 ofl,n|"2,n-l*J2,n-l^* '“l,n| 2, n-1 l,n-l
the 8 groups. In short, under very few conditions were the
conditional statistics in the present study found to be in
a rank order predicted by available mathematical models.
The fact that in several cases the increase in P(A 1 )
following an error was greater than that following a correct
A^ prediction apparently contradicts reinforcement theory.
However, this contradiction may be the result of rather nar-
row interpretations of the probability learning situation
by the above models. These models share the assumption that
34
reinforcement depends only upon the immediately preceding
event. For instance, Burke and Estes (1957) call for the
application of a linear operator if an occurs regard-
less of what has happened on earlier trials. Similarly,
in the Estes (1959) and Atkinson (1958) models, a Markovian
interpretation leads to predictions of one-step dependen-
cies in conditioning states. As Anderson (1964) points out,
such theories neglect the effects of certain rather potent
variables such as memory beyond one trial, patterns arising
in the sequencing of events, and transfer from pre-experi-
mental decision situations. Despite these neglected vari-
ables, Myers and Atkinson (1964) show that the conditional
statistics from the Myers et al. (1963) between-Ss incentive
study are in the predicted order.
The methodology of the present study was similar to
that of the Myers et al. (1963) study with the obvious ex-
ception of the present within-Ss manipulation of incentive
magnitude. This within-£s procedure used pre-trial cues
thereby introducing additional structure into the sequence
of events. Moore and Halpern (1966) also reported inversions
in the conditional statistics from a probability discrimina-
tion study which by its nature necessitated the use of pre-
trial cues. It is plausible that the structure added to
the sequence of events by pre-trial cues causes Ss to make
choices on the basis of small blocks of trials and that this,
in turn, may tend to reinforce negative recency.
35
SUMMARY
Each of 160 3s received 400 two-choice trials which
consisted of a random sequence of 200 10-chip and 200 1-
chip risks. The Ss were divided into 8 groups formed by
crossing two levels of (the probability of the more
frequent event— —under high risk) with 4 levels of ttl
(the probability of under low risk). A strong overall
incentive effect was found, and the probability of choosing
the more frequent event (P(A^)) continued to be greater
on 10-chip trials than on 1-chip trials even for groups in
which rrT exceeded tt . Observed P(A«) under each incentive
" H 1
level was related to tt under the second incentive level.
Subjective estimates of tt and tt also showed an incentive
ri Xj
effect with overestiraation of tt^ and underestimation of tt^.
These findings and. observed first-order conditional statis-
tics were discussed in relation to mathematical models.
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APPENDIX A
INSTRUCTIONS
We are studying how people make decisions. In this
experiment, we will be using this deck of cards. On the
back of each card there is drawn one of two geometric de-
signs—a point or a line. Your task is to try to predict
which design is on the back of each card. Your only clue
will be your experience in the situation.
For each card you will make your prediction, and then
I will turn the card over, showing you the design. If you
are correct, you win the amount written on the top of the
card—either 1 chip or 10 chips. If you are wrong, you lose
this same amount.
Before you is a stake of 200 chips with which to begin
the game. You will keep score with these chips. If you
make a correct prediction, take the appropriate number of
chips from the bank. If you make an incorrect prediction,
put the appropriate number of chips into the bank.
In this game you can win often and add considerably to
the chips you already have. But it is impossible for you
to win on every prediction since there is no pattern in this
deck of cards. So your task is to be correct as often as
you can over the long run. I have no control over the se-
quence of events, and I will be recording it as we go along.
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Before we start, I will shuffle the cards to Insure that
they are in a strictly random order.
Are there any questions? Now let’s begin with your
prediction for the first card. Remember, the two choicos are
point and line. Try to win as many chips as you can during
the session.
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The
inequality
will
be
true
if
the
first
and
second
terras
on
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left
exceed
the
third
and
fourth
terms
on
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right,
respectively,
since
two
remaining
terras
on
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Inspection
shows
this
inequality
true
It
necessarily
follows
that:
Preasymptotic
First-Order
Conditional
Statistics
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APPENDIX D
F.ratios from Analysis of Variance
of Subjective Reports ( n^)
Source of Variance
Between-Ss
:
High Risk tt (H)
Low Risk n (L)
HxL
Ss/HL
Within-Ss s
Incentive (I)
IxH
IxL
IxHxL
IxSs/HxL
df F-ratio
1 9.29 £<.005
3 6.75 p <.001
3 .42
152 (19^.28)
1 33.81 £<.001
1 2.61 £<.20
3 5.72 £<.001
3 .36
151 (299.47)
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APPENDIX F
Subjective Estimates of the Per Cent of
10-Chip Trials, tt
,
and tt l .
.60-. 50 Group
S# %10 TT TT %10
. 6O-. 6O Group
H
Males
Experimenter 1
1 50 70 40 50
Males
70 60
2 40 60 60 50 60 70
3 40 70 30 60 70 70
4 40 80 30 70 60 50
5 60 70 50 50 70 40
Experimenter 2
6 50 50 40 60 70 50
7 30 50 40 60 70 80
8 60 90 10 40 70 60
9 50 5° 50 50 80 70
10 30 60 40 50 70 70
Females Females
Experimenter 1
11 40 60 50 60 80 40
12 50 80 50 40 60 70
13 50 50 50 40 50 70
14 50 50 50 30 60 30
15 60 70 70 50 60 50
Experimenter 2
16 50 70 60 60 70 40
17 50 50 50 40 30 50
18 50 50 50 60 70 50
19 4o 70 60 40 60 50
20 60 90 60 60 80 30
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APPENDIX F (cont'd.)
s#
.60-.
$10
70 Group
n
H nL
.60-. 80 Group
$10 TT TT
H L
Males Males
Experimenter 1
1 40 30 70 30 60 70
2 40 90 50 40 80 50
3 40 50 70 50 70 90
4 50 80 60 40 60 60
5 60 60 60 40 70 80
Experimenter 2
6 50 60 50 30 60 70
7 50 30 50 50 50 70
8 40 70 70 40 60 90
9 50 70 60 40 40 60
10 70 80 20 60 80 90
Females Females
Experimenter 1
11 50 80 70 30 90 90
12 30 80 80 60 80 70
13 50 50 50 30 50 60
14 40 60 70 40 60 50
15 70 70 50 50 60 70
Experimenter 2
16 50 60 40 60 70 40
17 60 80 60 60 80 40
18 40 70 90 70 80 60
19 50 60 60 30 80 60
20 40 70 90 50 80 80
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APPENDIX P (cont'd.)
s#
.70-.
#10
50 Group
n
L
•70-.60 Group
*1° n
H
n
L
Males Males
Experimenter 1
1 60 80 50 50 80 60
2 40 80 30 70 80 70
3 40 80 50 40 70 60
4 50 80 60 40 60 50
5 40 70 50 60 80 30
Experimenter 2
6 40 80 50 30 70 60
7 40 70 80 40 70 80
8 50 70 60 40 80 80
9 50 80 20 50 50 50
10 50 70 30 60 70 50
Females Females
Experimenter 1
11 50 70 50 70 90 50
12 60 80 60 50 80 80
13 50 50 50 30 70 80
l4 50 90 50 60 70 40
15 50 80 40 70 90 10
Experimenter 2
16 80 90 50 70 90 60
17 40 70 50 50 50 50
18 60 80 60 30 80 70
19 60 80 50 50 80 40
20 70 80 50 40 80 70
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APPENDIX F (cont'd.)
s#
.70-. 70 Group
$10 17
H " L
• 7C
*10
>-.80 Group
17
H
v
L
Males Males
Experimenter 1
1 70 80 80 30 70 80
2 80 70 70 50 80 60
3 60 70 50 40 80 80
4 40 70 50 50 80 60
5 40 70 40 60 80 80
Experimenter 2
6 40 70 50 60 70 80
7 70 60 50 70 70 60
8 50 80 70 50 60 40
9 40 70 80 50 40 60
10 50 70 60 40 80 70
Females Females
Experimenter 1
11 40 80 90 40 90 40
12 50 60 70 40 60 70
13 50 80 40 40 90 60
14 50 70 30 50 70 90
15 50 80 70 40 60 80
Experimenter 2
16 60 90 70 30 20 90
17 60 40 50 50 80 80
18 50 90 60 50 80 80
19 50 80 60 50 70 80
20 60 80 60 60 80 70


